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Abstract
This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for
influence with a policy-making agency.  It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical
industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic
models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted
comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to
the endangered species list.  The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the
expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency.  There is
no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups
emerge from the Nash equilibrium of games with simultaneous moves and perfect information.
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Examples of  empirical papers that confirm that influence are Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington (1986), Cropper et 
2
al. (1992), and Ando (1997a).
 See Gardner (1987) and Bullock (1995).
3
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Pressure from interest groups has long been known to influence the process of forming policy
and carrying out regulatory activities.  Becker’s 1983 theory of interest-group competition took that
2
recognition one step further. His model yielded a number of provocative conclusions, including the
well-known hypothesis that political competition causes transfers between interest groups to be
accomplished with the most efficient instrument available. Because Becker’s work has been
intellectually influential, some empirical work has tried to test elements of his conclusions by
analyzing patterns in observed policy choice.  However, no studies have tested the basic proposition
3
that interest groups compete strategically for influence.  
That test is worth conducting for two main reasons. The first reason is intellectual curiosity;
it would be satisfying to verify whether interest groups generally behave in the rational manner
attributed to them by the assumptions of Becker’s work. If interest-group lobbying varies rationally
with the costs and benefits of proposed policies and with the intensity of pressure from other interest
groups, then that lobbying may well steer decision makers toward policies and policy instruments with
relatively high net benefits. The second reason is more practical. Scholars can use data on interest-
group activities (e.g. reactions to policy proposals, expenditures on direct conservation actions) toFor examples of analyses that analyze data on interest-group activities, see Ando (1997b), Bellido (1997), Crone and
4
Tshirart (1997), and Cropper et al. (1989).
-2-
shed light on matters such as the demand for public goods and the expected costs of the policies in
question.  The correct  interpretation of (and proper methodology for) such analyses may depend on
4
whether observed levels of interest-group pressure come from political Nash equilibria. For example,
if environmental groups lobby hard to save the spotted owl, that may be because they have a relatively
high willingness-to-pay to save the owl, or because the timber industry is fighting hard to keep it from
being added to the endangered species list. Thus, it would be useful to develop a sense of how
common strategic interest-group competition is. To that end, scholars must have an empirical
methodology available to test for strategic behavior when their  data are not well suited to traditional
econometric techniques.
This paper presents a test of the hypothesis that opposing interest groups pressure a
regulatory agency in a manner that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium of a struggle for influence
with simultaneous moves and perfect information. It uses data on interest-group responses to
proposals made by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to add new species to the list of those
protected under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). Many such proposals attract no
comments from one or both sides of the issue.  Hence, this case study uses discrete dependent
variables that record merely the presence or absence of pressure from each of the two sides.
Classic econometric approaches to simultaneous equations break down in the face of a model
of discrete strategic behavior. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) develop econometric methodology
to work with discrete game-theoretic models of firms deciding whether to enter new markets; this
paper adapts their techniques to a model of interest groups choosing whether or not to exert pressure
on the agency. The results of the analysis indicate that while the interest groups in this regulatoryThe key assumption is about how quickly deadweight losses rise with the size of the taxes and subsidies associated
5
with the policy.
 This paper is, however, limited to cases in which the slopes of the reaction functions have the same sign.
6
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arena do seem to respond reasonably to costs and benefits, there is no support for the hypothesis that
their behavior is strategic.
2 Model
This section develops a simple illustrative model of competing interest groups, and examines
the interface between that model and the econometric methodology designed by Bresnahan and Reiss
(henceforth B&R). The model is consistent with some of the basic features of Becker’s theory: there
are two interest groups; they compete in a Cournot-style model for influence by exerting pressure on
an agency; and their reaction functions may have positive slopes.  However, since the ultimate goal
of this paper is an econometric analysis, the model is flexible in some important ways. First, it imposes
no restrictions on the mechanism through which pressure is translated into regulatory outcomes. In
contrast to Becker’s work, where assumptions  yield reaction functions that are upward-sloping, my
5
model allows them to slope either up or down.   Second, it incorporates non-participation as a
6
strategy, since interest groups often choose not to exert any pressure at all with regard to a particular
policy proposal.  Third, it accommodates the possibility that interest groups behave non-strategically,
each side deciding how much pressure to exert without consideration of the other’s actions.
The two interest groups are on opposite sides of a policy debate (here, a proposal to add a
species to the endangered species list).  One stands to gain from the proposal and thus is for it (F );
the other will be harmed by the proposal if it is carried out, and thus is against it (A).  They decide
simultaneously how much to pressure the relevant policy maker about the proposal.  A group’sAi’1 if Pi>0, Ai’0 if Pi’0.
Ui(Pi) ’ U0i % Pi(ai%bi ¯ Pj) & (.5Pi
2% Aizi) & ci ¯ Pj
P
(
i ’ ai%bi ¯ Pj





i ) ’ U0i & zi % .5a
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i
 These are not sequential decisions, but components of a choice that is made at one time.
7
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decision can be thought of as having two components.  It chooses whether to exert any pressure at
all; if that decision is affirmative, it also picks exactly what positive amount of pressure (P) to exert.
7
Group i’s participation decision A  is defined for notational purposes as:  i
(1)
If A = 1, group i chooses P  to maximize its utility U(P ) conditional on P, where i i i i  j
(2)
with a , c , z  > 0 for i = A, F .  The first term is the baseline level of utility.  The second term gives i i  i
the gross benefit to group i of its own pressure.  The third term is the cost of exerting pressure, which
has a variable and a fixed component.  The fourth term is the cost imposed on group i of group j’s
pressure, which exists even if group i opts not to participate in the competition for influence. The
solution to the maximization problem is:
(3)
With this information and the assumption that the groups choose simultaneously, the game
can be collapsed to a simultaneous decision of whether or not to exert P*.  If A = 0, the payoffs to i j
group i of its two available strategies are:
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If A  = 1, and stability is imposed on the Nash-equilibrium of the choices of  P* and  P* by assuming j  i j
b b < 1, then the payoffs to group i are: i j
(5)
Hence, group i’s payoff matrix can be written as:
Group i’s Payoffs
A = 0 A = 1  j j
 A = 0 U U  -  c a i 0i 0i i  j
 
A = 1 U   -  z  + .5 a U   -  z  -  c A  + .5 A i 0 i i i 
2
0i i i j i
* * 2
Following the expository tactics of B&R (1991), the payoff matrix can be clarified by
defining:
(6)
Then the payoff matrix can be re-written as:
Group i’s Payoffs, Simplified
A = 0 A = 1 j j
A = 0 U U i 0i 1i
A = 1 i U  + * U   + *  + * 0 i 0 i 1i 0 i 1i
With this notation, it becomes clear that the Nash-equilibrium strategy choices can be written
simply as:A
(
i ’0 ] *0i% A
(
j *1i < 0
*1i<0 ] ci(A
(









A number of papers have illustrated that games like this can have poorly defined reduced
forms.   Heckman (1978) shows that the problem can be resolved by assuming that the payoffs of one
8
side are unaffected by the actions of the other; that approach, however, rules out the hypothesis that
this paper aims to test.  B&R (1990, 1991) find that it is sufficient to constrain the range of values
taken by * .  Specifically, they assume that *  is negative.  That makes economic sense in the case 1i 1i
they highlight (entry into a new market) because U  = U , and *  < 0 means only that a monopolist’s 0i 1i 1i
profits fall when a competitor enters its market.  In a model of interest-group competition, however,
U  > U , and the assumption of  *  < 0 is not trivial. 0i 1i  1i
For  *  < 0 to hold true, the following condition must be satisfied: 1i
(8)
This is effectively a condition that requires c , the damage done to group i by a unit of pressure from i 
group j, to be “big”.  To illustrate, consider the completely symmetric case, and recall that  | b | 0
[0,1). For a given slope of the reaction functions, Equation 8 yields the condition that c must be x
times greater than a to have *  < 0.  That factor x is traced out in Figure 1; x grows as b grows. 1i
Intuitively, if b is large and positive, then pressure from group j actually helps group i by increasing
the marginal benefit of its own pressure; c must be especially large to counteract that. Since there is
no reason to assume that *  < 0, this paper presents the results of two econometric analyses: one 1iA
(
i ’0 ] *0i < 0
-7-
assumes that  *  and *   are negative, and the other maintains the hypothesis that *  and *  are 1A 1F 1A 1F
positive.
Each of these econometric models is tested against the null hypothesis that the interest groups
are not behaving strategically. Such “irrational” behavior is more difficult to model in economics,
since most economic theory is predicated on the assumption of rational behavior.  However, non-
strategic behavior may be represented here by setting b  and b  equal to zero, as each group ignores A F
the impact of the other’s pressure on the marginal product of its own lobbying. Such shortsighted
behavior yields group i’s payoffs given as:
Group i’s Non-Strategic Payoffs
A = 0 A = 1 j j
A = 0 U U i 0i 1i
A = 1 i U  +  * U   +  * 0i 0i 1i 0i
If group i is not acting strategically, its choice of A should be independent of the other i
group’s characteristics and choices.  This model yields such a decision rule easily; the groups decide
whether or not to exert any pressure according to:
(9)
In the framework of this paper, the hypothesis of non-strategic behavior reduces conveniently to the
assumption that *  = 0. 1i
3 Econometrics
Independent variables and stochastic error terms are worked into the model as follows.  For
interest group i = A or F, let*0i ’ Xi$i % gi / uMi % gi
Y
(
i / uMi % Aj*1i % gi ;
uDi / uMi % *1i
A
(
i ’0 ] Y
(
i <0
 *  may also be specified to have a random component as long as the support of the distribution of the random term
9
1
is limited to be consistent with the coherency restriction.  See B&R (1990, 1991) for details and an example.




where X is a matrix of independent variables, $ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, g is a i i i
random error, A is an indicator variable for whether the other group does any lobbying, and * is a j   1i
constant to be estimated.   Under the framework of Equations 7 and 9, and given the specification
9
set forth in Equation 10, interest groups’ observed choices of whether to exert pressure are related
to observed and unobserved factors according to:
(11)
In order to estimate an econometric model based on Equation 11, a coherency restriction on
the signs of *  and *  must be made.  Model 1 assumes that *  and *  are negative; this is the 1 A 1A 1F 1F
restriction made by B&R in their work.  The resulting map of equilibrium strategies into the space
of unobserved error terms is given in Figure 2 (where N refers to the number of interest groups that
exert non-zero levels of pressure).   Most notably, the middle rectangle can support two pure-
10
strategy equilibria: “A  = 0,  A  = 1” and “A  = 0,  A  = 1”. Roughly, this area exists because when A  F  F  A 
both sides are moderately motivated to exert pressure, either one could profitably act as the lone
group submitting comments, but the cost of having a competitor is great enough to preclude a
duopoly.  As B&R point out, this region of non-uniqueness imposes observational equivalenceAA’0, AF’0: Pn ’ Pr(gA<&Xn$ , gF<&Xn$) ’ M(&Xn$, &Xn$, D)
AA’1, AF’1: Pn ’ Pr(gA >&(Xn$&)) , gF >&(Xn$&))) ’ M(Xn$&), Xn$&), D)
otherwise: Pn ’ 1&M(&Xn$, &Xn$, D)&M(Xn$&), Xn$&), D)
-9-
between the two “N=1” outcomes. Thus, this model distinguishes only between three outcomes:
“N=0”, “N=1”, and “N=2”.  The observational equivalence means that the coefficients $ and *  in   1
the two equations must be estimated to be the same for both interest groups.
The likelihood function for Model 1 is constructed by assuming that g  and g  are distributed A F
bivariate standard normal with correlation coefficient D. Then the likelihood contribution of
observation n, P ,  falls into one of three categories: n 
(12)
This model is estimated constraining | D | #1 and )>0 (so *  < 0) .   1
A second strategic model can be constructed by assuming that *  and *  are positive. The 1 A 1F
resulting map of strategies into the error space is shown in Figure 3.  The center rectangle once again
supports two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but now that region supports either N=0 or N=2.  The
rough intuition here is that since the net effect of having an opponent is beneficial, groups with errors
that fall in the rectangle can gain if both exert pressure on the agency; however, no one group is
motivated enough to comment if the other group does not join in.  In this model, the two “N=1”
outcomes can be differentiated.  However, if  g  and g  are reasonably similar, their magnitude cannot A F
be identified; “N=2” and “N=0” are observationally equivalent.  That equivalence plays a role in
constructing the likelihood function.  It does not, however, force the $  and *  coefficients to be   1
estimated to be the same for the two groups.  Given the same distributional assumptions over g  and A
g  that were made for Model 1, the likelihood contribution of an observation in Model 2 is: FAA’0, AF’1: Pn ’ Pr(gA< &(Xn$A%)A) , gF >&Xn$F )
’ M(&(Xn$A%)A)) & M(&(Xn$A%)A), &Xn$F , D)
AA’1, AF’0: Pn ’ Pr(gF < &(Xn$F %)F ) , gA >&Xn$A )
’ M(&(Xn$F %)F )) & M(&(Xn$F %)F ), &Xn$A , D)
otherwise: Pn ’ 1& M(&(Xn$A%)A)) % M(&(Xn$A%)A), &Xn$F , D)
& M(&(Xn$F %)F )) % M(&(Xn$F %)F ), &Xn$A , D)
-10-
(13)
This model is also estimated constraining | D | #1 and ) >0 (which in this case makes *  > 0) . i 1i  
Figure 4 shows the map of outcomes into the random-variable space under the assumption
of non-strategic behavior.  With bivariate-normal error terms, this base-case model is a simple
bivariate probit.  There are four outcomes that can be identified, and the probability of each
corresponds to the probability that the random variables fall in each of the four areas shown in the
figure.  Note, however, that if Model 1 or Model 2 is estimated under the hypothesis that  *  = * 1A  1F 
= 0, the result is not exactly a bivariate probit. In each case, two outcomes are maintained as
observationally equivalent, and thus the probability assigned to any such outcome is greater than it
is in the similar bivariate probit. The test for strategic behavior is a test for * ￿ 0, but the comparison 1 
models use limited information.
The relationship outlined in Figure 1 indicates that Model 1 is relatively more likely to obtain
when the reaction functions slope down, and Model 2 is more likely when the reaction functions slope
up.  However, testing the models against one another would not constitute a true test of whether
pressure from interest-groups are strategic complements or substitutes.  The empirical approach taken
in this paper can only really test the null hypothesis of no strategic behavior at all.The National Marine Fisheries Service has jurisdiction over marine species and anadromous fish (like salmon). 
11
These species comprise a small part of the endangered species list, and are not included in the current study.
-11-
4 Case Study Data
The ESA directs the administering agencies (largely the FWS ) to develop and maintain a list
11
of species designated as endangered or threatened. Each addition to the list is supposed to be made
only on the basis of whether scientific evidence exists to show that a species is in danger of extinction.
Once a species is officially on the list, it becomes illegal for anyone to “take” that species, where
“take” is defined as “to harass, harm pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” a
member of the species. This proscription often yields restrictions on how land can be used, both
private and public. Hence, there are winners and losers associated with each new listing.  Agents
(individuals and groups) who want to prevent land from being developed or exploited gain from the
listing of a species, whether because they care deeply about the species that depend on that land or
because they want to protect the land for aesthetic, recreational or moral reasons.  On the other hand,
owners of private land and users of public land may suffer losses as a result of the listing of a species
that occurs on the land they own and use.  Development may be halted, or may have to be redesigned
to prevent harm to the protected species; exploitative activities such as logging, mining, and grazing
may be curtailed or halted for the same reason; groundwater pumping may be restricted to prevent
depletion of pools and springs in which rare species reside.
Every time the agency places a proposal in the Federal Register to add new species to the list,
interest groups coalesce on each side of the proposal.  The group opposed to a given listing can
include any combination of local land owners, local citizens that may be affected by water-use
restrictions, and firms and workers associated with industries (like logging and mining) that are likelyLand users can take irreversible actions (like cutting trees or laying the foundation for a building) during the delay
12
that would have been precluded had the species been listed more promptly.  The species may become extinct while it waits to
be protected.  Less dramatically, its numbers may dwindle to where recovery is made very difficult.
Interest-group pressure may also affect decisions made by the FWS after the species has been listed, such as how
13
much critical habitat (land subject to special  restrictions) to designate for the species.  
Usually, species that go through the administrative listing process in groups have something like habitat range or
14
species type in common.
One potential argument, however, is that groups which support new listings may be more alert to proposals of such
15
listings, since these groups are often responsible for bringing the species to the attention of the FWS through petitions.  This
may make them Stackelberg leaders, particularly in the case of species that were the subject of petitions.  The effect of that
change in the game on Model 1 is to eliminate observational equivalence; B&R show that the middle rectangle goes to the
leader.  Future extensions of this paper may evaluate the theoretical effect on Model 2, and estimate the two models given the
-12-
to be adversely affected by the listing.  On the other side, support comes from environmental groups
(both local and national), scientists, and individual local citizens.  Ando (1997a) shows that while
almost all species proposed for listing are eventually listed, interest-group pressure can affect how
long the species waits to be listed (and hence protected); support shortens the wait, and opposition
drags it out. Since delay postpones the costs and reduces the benefits of a listing , these groups have
12
something to gain by pressuring the agency.  
13
This paper analyzes pressure in the form of comments submitted to the FWS during the
comment period that follows the agency’s proposal to add a species (or group of species) to the list.
14
There may be other facets of pressure exerted by the groups on the FWS, but comments are an
important component of such pressure, and the presence or absence of comments is likely to be a
good indicator of the existence or non-existence of pressure overall. Comments are observable and
quantifiable, since the FWS summarizes the number of comments it receives in favor of and in
opposition to each listing proposal in Federal Register notices of final listing. Comment data are also
well-suited to the purposes of this paper because the “game” of submitting comments is structured
in reality to have  simultaneous moves; there is no compelling reason to argue that one particular
group submits its comments first, after which the other group responds.
15assumption of Stackelberg timing.
This statement is based on my perusal of the Federal Register final listing decisions, in which the FWS often
16
summarizes the content of the comments it received on the case at hand.
That modification is not crucial to the qualitative results of the analyses performed herein.  However, future
17
refinement of this paper will aim to reduce the bias in reported numbers of comments in a less arbitrary  fashion.
-13-
This study uses data on 172 proposals to add species to the endangered species list that were
promulgated during 1989-1994.  Table 1 gives the number of observations that received a given
number of comments for and against the proposal. These counts exclude comments that the FWS
identies as having arrived after the initial 90-day comment period, in order to measure only the initial
pulse of pressure. Some listing proposals generate extremely large amounts of interest-group
pressure; the number of comments ranges up into the thousands. These large outliers make testing
for strategic behavior difficult to accomplish in an econometric framework based on linear or limited-
dependent-variable methodology. At the same time, the table reveals that many observations receive
no opposing and/or  supporting comments. The decision of whether to participate in the comment
process is empirically an important facet of the interest-groups’ strategies; these data are well-suited
to the discrete methodology adopted by this paper.
The number of proposals that attract no opposition is greater than the number that attract no
support. This may be in part because the FWS tends to classify essentially neutral rubber-stamp
approvals from other agencies as “support.”  Since that kind of support is not really pressure from
16
a supporting interest group, the categorization of whether or not a species received any support is
modified by subtracting one from the number of supporting comments reported by the agency.  The
17
final dependent variables, A  and A , are given in Table 2. The cross-tabulation illustrates that all A F
combinations of A  and A  are found in these data. A FBecause Model 1 requires the coefficients $ to be constrained to be the same in both equations, this study can only
18
consider X variables that are likely to play similar roles in both equations.  For an analysis of interest-group pressure regarding
endangered-species listings that includes more variables but does not test rigorously for strategic behavior, see Ando (1997b).
This scaling factor is for convenience only.
19
-14-
Both the gains and losses associated with a listing may grow with the amount of new land
protected as a result of the listing.  Hence, proposed listings that will result in relatively widespread
new land-use restrictions may generate stronger support and opposition.  This study uses data on
three species characteristics that are likely to affect the quantity of new land protected as a result of
a listing; these characteristics comprise the matrix X of variables that are likely to have a similar
influence on  both groups’ propensity to comment.  First, vertebrates tend to have larger ranges than
18
plants and invertebrates.  Second, while foreign species are added to the list, the power of U.S. law
to protect them is limited; the ESA can reduce trade in such species, but it can not be used to place
restrictions on the use of land in foreign countries. Third, some new listings are made in areas where
a large number of species have already been put on the endangered species list.  If species in the same
area have overlapping habitat, then the new listing may result in little additional land being affect by
use restrictions.  
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the precise variables used.  “Vertebrate” is an indicator
variable of whether all the species in a proposal are vertebrates (as opposed to plants or
invertebrates).  “Domestic” is a dummy for whether the species occur in the United States.  Federal
Register notices of proposals and final listings provided information on whether the species in each
proposal were vertebrates and domestic species, and dates for the 172 proposals.  The statistic
summarized in “Density previously listed” is one-hundred times  the number of previously-listed
19
species per square kilometer in the counties that comprise the habitat of the newly-proposed species-15-
at the time of the new proposal.  This density was constructed using data from several sources.
Census data from 1990 provided the land area of each county.  A data set maintained by the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Pesticide Programs identified the counties in which
listed species are found.  Where needed, those data were supplemented with information from the
Fish and Wildlife Service’s Internet site, which also provided the dates of final listing for all species
on the list.
5 Results
For a given proposal to add species to the list and a given interest group, the econometric
model specifies X$  to equal the expected value of * . As defined in Equation 6, *  is intuitively the 0 0
net benefit to the group of submitting  comments to the agency in the absence of pressure from the
other group. Thus, positive coefficients correspond to proposal features that increase what a group
thinks it has to gain from pressuring the agency.
Two true bivariate probit (BVP) estimations were run as benchmarks, neither of which
imposes any observational equivalency on outcomes; those maximum-likelihood results are in   Table
4.  The first BVP analysis constrains the coefficients to be the same in the equations for supporting
and opposing pressure. All three explanatory variables have significant coefficients that  bear signs
consistent with the hypothesis that interest groups care more about new listings that are likely to place
restrictions on large amounts of previously unrestricted land; vertebrates and domestic species are
more likely to stimulate comments, and proposals in areas with many previously listed species get less
attention. In the second BVP analysis, the coefficient constraints are relaxed. A likelihood-ratio test
rejects the hypothesis that those constraints are not binding. However, the coefficients are-16-
qualitatively similar in the two equations; both interest groups have more to gain from pressuring the
agency over vertebrates and domestic species, and less from pressure regarding proposals in areas
that are dense in previously listed species.  Most of the coefficients remain significant in the
unconstrained BVP analysis (except for the coefficient on “vertebrates” in the equation for support).
The correlation coefficient is positive in both BVP estimations, but only significantly different from
zero in the unconstrained version.  
Table 5  presents  the  results  from  two maximum-likelihood  analyses designed to test
Model 1, which requires the restrictions that $  = $  and )   = ) .  The results in the first columns A  F A F
correspond to the null-hypothesis of no competition where ) = 0, but the likelihood function still
imposes observational equivalence on the outcomes  “A  = 0,  A  = 1” and “A  = 0,  A  = 1” in A  F  F  A 
order to be comparable to the likelihood function for Model 1. Comparing these results to the
constrained BVP in Table 4 shows the effect that observational equivalence has on the estimation.
The coefficient estimates and standard errors are completely identical; given the coefficient
constraints, the observational equivalence induces no information loss that changes the estimates.
However, the log-likelihood value is reduced when the two “N=1” outcomes are combined into a
single outcome, since that formulation assigns a higher probability to any “N=1” observation than
does the true BVP.
The second set of columns in Table 5 contains the results for Model 1 itself.  If  ) were
estimated to be significantly greater than zero, this analysis would support the hypothesis that interest
groups compete strategically.  However, the value of the maximized log-likelihood function is not
changed with the addition of the parameter ), and the other coefficient values are almost exactly the-17-
same as they were in the Base Model 1 estimation.  The parameter equal to ln()) moves toward a
large negative number (i.e. ) very close to zero), and its standard error at the “optimum” is very
large.  This implies that the gradient of the log-likelihood function with respect to the crucial ) is
very flat, and the constraint of )>0 is probably binding.  In order to understand the results better,
maximum-likelihood estimates of the other parameters were found with ) fixed at a variety of points.
The values of the log-likelihood functions corresponding to these conditional maximum-likelihood
estimates are plotted against ) in Figure 5.  The log-likelihood is greatest at )=0  (i.e. * = 0), though
) gets reasonably large before the drop in the log-likelihood is substantial. These results fail to reject
the hypothesis that the interest groups in this regulatory arena do not compete strategically according
to the framework described by Model 1.
Table 6 shows results that enable a similar test of Model 2, which does not force the
parameter estimates to be constrained across interest groups.  The point estimates in the model
corresponding to the null hypothesis of Model 2 are qualitatively similar to those found in the
unconstrained BVP.  However, the coefficients are not identical, and several previously-significant
coefficients are now insignificant.  It seems that the observational equivalence necessary to render this
base model comparable to Model 2 generates non-trivial information loss.  Observations with either
“N=2” or “N=0” add to the estimation of D, but contribute no information to the estimation of the
$ coefficients; that loss reduces the precision of the estimates.
Model 2 itself performs in much the same way as Model 1.  Again, positive estimates of )A
and )  would support the hypothesis of strategic competition. Instead, the maximum log-likelihood FSupporters of new listings often include national environmental groups that have worked this particular political
20
game many times before.
-18-
value and the $ coefficients are unchanged from those of the base model, and ln() ) and ln() ) go A F
to large negative numbers in the equations for support and opposition, with large standard errors that
signal flat gradients. The maximum log-likelihood conditional on )  and )  (where )  = )  = ) A F A F
for clarity in exposition) is traced out in Figure 6. The conditional maximum log-likelihood is greatest
at )=0; the function declines slowly at first as ) increases, but drops off sharply beyond values of
) equal to .1.  In much the same way as Model 1, Model 2 does not reject the hypothesis that these
interest groups do not compete.
6  Conclusion
In the empirical case study presented here, interest-groups do respond reasonably to species
characteristics that can be expected to influence the costs and benefits that accrue to the groups as
a result of protecting the species.  The groups are not behaving as knee-jerk ideologues.  However,
the analyses in this paper do not support the hypothesis that these groups compete strategically for
influence over the FWS.  This is good news for empirical work in the realm of endangered species
protection.  Researchers have some justsification for  suppressing concerns about endogeneity in
studies that use data on interest-group activities to shed light on the demand for species protection
and the costs to society of such conservation policies.
More case studies must be done, however, before these results can be generalized to the
behavior of interest groups in other areas, if such a generalization can ever be made at all. Some of
the interest groups opposed  to endangered-species listings may be relatively inexperienced in the
20-19-
world of political activism, and unaccustomed to the strategic thinking that is relevant to their
decisions about lobbying intensity. Also, endangered-species protection tends to be a particularly
emotional issue; strong emotions could dominate strategic concerns. Interest groups in other areas
of public policy might be more likely to behave according to a paradigm of rational strategic decision
making.
More work can be done to develop the methodology, as well.  In particular, where the same
interest-groups compete repeatedly, the single-move Cournot framework that neglects the
connections between individual policy debates may be unrealistic.  Future work might do well to
explore the potential for using a repeated-game framework in this kind of empirical analysis.
Nonetheless, the results of this relatively simple case study do show that if empirical work and
policy prescriptions are to be based upon the assumption that interest-groups compete strategically,
that assumption needs to be tested. The discrete-dependent-variable econometric methodology used
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Figure 1: x such that c >= xa guarantees *  < 0   (given b) 1 



















Figure 3: Model 2
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Table 1: Tabulation of Numbers of Comments Submitted














Table 2: Cross-Tabulation of Dependent Variables
A  = A  = Tota A A
A  = 35 11 46 F
A  = 51 75 126 F
Total 86 86 172
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
Variable Mean Min Max
Vertebrates 0.23 0 1
Domestic 0.85 0 1
Density previously listed 3.60 0.00 32.8-24-
Table 4: True Bivariate Probit (BVP) Results
Constrained BVP Unconstrained BVP
LL = -204.430 LL = -186.212
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
For :        Vertebrates 0.563 0.196 * 0.342 0.278
For :        Domestic 1.107 0.220 * 0.863 0.295 *
For :        Density previously listed -0.052 0.015 * -0.070 0.021 *
For :        constant -0.557 0.200 * 0.113 0.260
Against : Vertebrates 0.841 0.266 *
Coefficients
constrained to be the
same in the two
equations.
Against : Domestic 1.731 0.377 *
Against : Density previously listed -0.036 0.020 +
Against : constant -1.567 0.367 *
D 0.204 0.129 0.440 0.127 *
Note: * means significant at 5% level, + means significant at 10% level.
Table 5: Model 1 Results
Null Model 1 Strategic Model 1
LL = -161.450 LL = -161.450
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Vertebrates 0.563 0.196 * 0.564 0.232 *
Domestic 1.107 0.220 * 1.107 0.335 *
Density previously listed  -0.052 0.015 * -0.052 0.019 *
constant -0.557 0.200 * -0.556 0.328 +
ln()) delta equals zero -6.852 724.600
D 0.204 0.129 0.206 0.923
Notes: (1) * means significant at 5% level, + means significant at 10% level.
(2) ) > 0 implies * < 0.  Strategic Model 1 imposes the constraint that ) > 0. 1 -25-
Table 6: Model 2 Results
Null Model 2 Strategic Model 2
LL =  - 134.28 LL =  -134.28 
Coef. SE Coef. SE
F : Vertebrates 0.093 0.424 0.093 0.40
F : Domestic 1.364 0.654 * 1.364 0.59 *
F : Density previously listed -0.046 0.035 -0.046 0.035
F : constant -0.122 0.272 -0.122 0.270
A : Vertebrates 0.737 0.376 * 0.737 0.361 *
A : Domestic 5.777 0.691 * 5.956 0.419 *
A : Density previously listed -0.009 0.033 -0.009 0.033
A : constant -5.469 0.469 * -5.648 0.340 *
F : ln()) deltas equal zero -13.581 1197.9
A : ln()) -12.670 970.6
D 0.255 0.550 0.255 0.494
Notes: (1) * means significant at 5% level, + means significant at 10% level.
(2) ) > 0 implies *  > 0.  Strategic Model 2 imposes the constraint that ) > 0. 1 -26-
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